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The Minimum Distribution Rules and Their Critical 
Role in Controlling the Floodgates of Qualified Plan 
Wealth 
 
Jay A. Soled and Bruce A. Wolk∗  
I. INTRODUCTION 
When complete in 2009, the Three Gorges Dam at the Yangtze 
River will retain trillions of gallons of water.1 The scope of this tech-
nological feat cannot be overstated. The dam will tower over 600 
feet high; it will flood an area almost equal in size to half of the state 
of Rhode Island; and the twenty-six turbines it houses will generate 
electricity equivalent to that of eighteen nuclear power plants.2 With 
the flip of a few floodgate switches, Chinese officials will have the 
ability to unleash a massive flow of water, enabling them to meet 
many of their country’s huge energy and aquatic needs. 
In the United States, there are no dams the size of the Three 
Gorges Dam. Yet, there is a vast pool, not of water, but of trillions of 
dollars of wealth that is contained in tax-free qualified plans (includ-
ing individual retirement accounts).3 Like the Chinese officials who 
will oversee water flow at the Three Gorges Dam, Congress has the 
ability to determine how and when the floodgates of this qualified 
plan wealth will be released. Commonly referred to as the minimum 
distribution rules, these “floodgate switches” are embodied in 
 
 
 ∗ Jay A. Soled is a professor at Rutgers University, and Bruce A. Wolk is a professor at 
the University of California, Davis. 
 1. See Arthur Zich, China’s Three Gorges Before the Flood, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC MAG., 
Sept. 1997, at 2. 
 2. See id. at 10-11. 
 3. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 1998 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 534 (stating that qualified plans, including assets held by state and local governments, 
held $6.946 trillion at the end of 1997). Treasury officials recently reached similar estimates. 
Lubick’s Summary of Administration’s Pension Reform Proposals at W&M Hearing, TAX NOTES 
TODAY, Mar. 24, 1999, at 39-56. 
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Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) § 401(a)(9).4 Upon certain 
triggering events, these rules require plan participants or their desig-
nated beneficiaries to take distributions from their qualified plans.5 
To date, Congress appears satisfied that the minimum distribu-
tion rules adequately regulate the flow of qualified plan wealth, as 
evidenced by its lack of proposals to change these rules. However, 
this sense of satisfaction is misplaced. The minimum distribution 
rules are an administrative nightmare, and they fail to achieve their 
intended goal of forcing plan participants to use their retirement as-
sets during their and their spouses’ lifetimes. Put differently, the 
floodgate switches are precariously stuck in the “off” position. While 
this state of affairs may foster swelling retirement account balances, it 
restricts the flow of federal tax dollars rippling into the federal coffer 
to a mere trickle. 
The analysis that follows is divided into four sections. Section II 
sets forth the factors that make an evaluation of the minimum distri-
bution rules timely. Section III provides an overview of the mini-
mum distribution rules and how they regulate the flow of qualified 
plan wealth. Section IV evaluates the administrability and equity of 
the minimum distribution rules and whether they should be retained 
in their current form. Finally, Section V offers various proposals that 
would make the minimum distribution rules more effective. 
II. TIMELINESS OF EVALUATION 
The establishment of qualified plans by employers is a fairly re-
cent phenomenon in the United States.6 Various tax incentives, 
however, have caused their growth to flourish, making them a nearly 
 
 4. Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 
as amended. 
 5. For purposes of this analysis, the term “qualified plans” refers to the entire gamut of 
tax-favored retirement plans, all of which are subject to the minimum distribution rules. These 
include employer-provided qualified pension and profit-sharing plans (I.R.C. § 401), tax de-
ferred annuities (I.R.C. § 403), unfunded deferred compensation plans of state and local gov-
ernments (I.R.C. § 457), individual retirement accounts (“IRAs”) (I.R.C. § 408), and Roth 
IRAs (I.R.C. § 408A). 
 6. For an overview of the early historic stages of private pension plans, see WILLIAM C. 
GREENOUGH & FRANCIS P. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 27-47 (1976). For 
an overview of the economic motivations that inspired businesses to implement private pension 
plans, see STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS: THE FIRST HUNDRED 
YEARS 18-37 (1997). 
SOL-FIN.DOC 5/8/00  1:08 PM 
587] Minimum Distribution Rules and Their Critical Role 
 589 
ubiquitous feature in today’s labor market.7 These incentives include 
the following privileges: employers receive an immediate income tax 
deduction for contributions made on the behalf of employees to 
qualified plans,8 employees are not required to declare such contribu-
tions as income until they are distributed,9 and earnings on assets 
held in qualified plans may accumulate free from income tax.10 Along 
with Social Security and private savings, qualified plan wealth is sup-
posed to enable taxpayers to enjoy the same standard of living pre- 
and postemployment.11 
Promoting taxpayers’ use of qualified plans through various tax 
incentives comes at a price: taxpayers are able to shelter income that 
would otherwise be taxed. By sanctioning the deferral of tax on tril-
lions of dollars, Congress has lost (and continues to lose) billions of 
dollars annually in potential revenue.12 In order to curtail this reve-
nue loss and to ensure that qualified plan wealth is used on behalf of 
plan participants (and their spouses), Congress instituted the mini-
mum distribution rules.13 At first, these rules applied only to a small 
number of qualified plans, namely those established by the self-
 
 7. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT 
LAW 25-29 (2000) (outlining the characteristics of those employees who participate in quali-
fied plans). 
 8. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(1)-(3). In the case of traditional IRAs, there is no employer de-
duction, but the contribution is directly deductible by the employee. See id. § 219. 
 9. See id. §§ 402-403. 
 10. See id. §§ 408(e)(1), 501(a). As in the case with exempt organizations, qualified 
plans are taxed on “unrelated business income,” which is essentially the income from any trade 
or business regularly carried on by the trust or by a partnership of which it is a member. See id. 
§§ 511-513(b). 
 11. See Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Poli-
cies, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 855 (1987) (“Thus, while there are no doubt disagreements at 
the margin, replacement of some significant portion of preretirement wages must be the fun-
damental goal of retirement security policy.”). A series of other law reviews express similar 
views. See Nancy Altman, Rethinking Retirement Income Policies: Nondiscrimination, Integra-
tion and the Quest for Worker Security, 42 TAX L. REV. 433 (1987); Michael A. Oberst, A Per-
spective of the Qualified Plan Tax Subsidy, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 603 (1983); Bruce A. Wolk, Dis-
crimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 
70 VA. L. REV. 419 (1984). 
 12. See Robert L. Clark & Elisa Wolper, Pension Tax Expenditures: Magnitude, Distribu-
tion, and Economic Effects, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD PENSIONS 41-84 (Sylvester J. Schieber 
& John B. Shoven eds., 1997) (pointing out that revenue losses attributable to pension plan 
provisions constitute the single largest tax expenditure in the federal budget); see infra Table I 
and accompanying text (detailing the magnitude of the tax expenditure). 
 13. See § 401(a)(9). 
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employed.14 Eventually, however, Congress expanded their coverage 
to apply to virtually all qualified plans.15 Upon the passage of time or 
the occurrence of certain events, these rules require that plan partici-
pants remove wealth from the tax-free sanctuary of their qualified 
plans.16 
Until recently, the minimum distribution rules played a marginal 
role in dictating the outflow of wealth from qualified plans. This was 
largely due to the fact that most employers traditionally established 
defined benefit plans.17 Under the terms of these plans, a participant 
is promised a specific benefit upon retirement, which is determined 
under a formula contained in the plan.18 Once determined, the bene-
fit is ordinarily distributed in the form of a single life annuity (or 
joint annuity, in the case of married participants).19 This type of dis-
tribution obviates the need for minimum distribution rules since 
such payments are automatically spread evenly over the life of the 
participant and the participant’s spouse and cease upon their death. 
Defined benefit plan distributions are rarely made to persons other 
than plan participants and their spouses.20 
 
 14. See Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-792, § 
2, 76 Stat. 809, 809 (1962). Even prior to the introduction of the minimum distribution rules, 
the Internal Revenue Service (“Service”) took the position that plan participants’ efforts to 
provide death benefits would violate the exclusive benefit rule. The exclusive benefit rule re-
quires that qualified plans primarily benefit employees rather than their designated beneficiar-
ies. See Rev. Rul. 56-656, 1956-2 C.B. 280 (stating that an arrangement does not qualify un-
der I.R.C. § 401(a) if the benefits it provides are not payable to an employee but only to his 
beneficiary upon his death); Rev. Rul. 74-360, 1974-2 C.B. 130 (holding that because the 
participant’s beneficiary or beneficiaries may receive concurrent payments from the plan prior 
to the death of the plan participant, the profit-sharing plan fails to qualify under I.R.C. § 
401(a)). 
 15. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 
310(b)(1), 96 Stat. 324, 327 (1982). 
 16. See infra Section III. 
 17. See SASS, supra note 6, at 147-78; Olivia S. Mitchell & Sylvester J. Schieber, Defined 
Contribution Pensions: New Opportunities, New Risks, in LIVING WITH DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS: REMAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR RETIREMENT 1-15 (Olivia S. 
Mitchell & Sylvester J. Schieber eds., 1998) [hereinafter DEFINED CONTRIBUTION 
PENSIONS]. 
 18. The amount of this benefit is usually based upon a formula that takes into account 
factors such as the participant’s age, years of service, and salary. For a general description of 
defined benefit plan dynamics, see MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT AND OTHER 
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS ¶¶ 3.51-.59 (1997). 
 19. See RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, PENSIONS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 103-05 
(1986). 
 20. This is because (i) spousal consent is required to name a designated beneficiary other 
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But the minimum distribution rules have now begun to play a 
pivotal role in dictating the flow (or trickle) of wealth out of quali-
fied plans. This is because over the last two decades the retirement 
planning environment has undergone dramatic changes. The nature 
of these changes and their implications are discussed in the subsec-
tions that follow. 
A. Popularity of Defined Contribution Plans 
Over the past two decades, defined contribution plans (including 
IRAs) have evolved to be the qualified plan of choice, eclipsing the 
once dominant role of defined benefit plans.21 In general, a defined 
contribution plan is a qualified plan in which the plan participant is 
not guaranteed a predetermined benefit upon retirement but instead 
has an individual account that houses his or her retirement wealth.22 
Several factors have led to the preference for defined contribution 
plans over defined benefit plans. 
First, over the past three decades, major legislative changes have 
made defined benefit plans more difficult and expensive to maintain. 
With the intention of overhauling the private retirement planning 
system, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (“ERISA”) in 1974.23 Among other things, this legislation im-
posed strict minimum funding requirements on defined benefit 
plans.24 To comply with the minimum funding requirements, em-
ployers with defined benefit plans must retain the services of an actu-
ary who must annually monitor current and projected plan assets and 
liabilities. ERISA also established the Pension Benefit Guarantee 
Corporation (“PBGC”) to monitor plan solvency and insure the 
 
than the spouse, see I.R.C. § 401(a)(11), and (ii) upon the death of the plan participant, under 
the terms of most defined benefit plans the surviving spouse cannot name a new designated 
beneficiary. 
 21. See ANGELA CHANG, EXPLANATIONS FOR THE TREND AWAY FROM DEFINED 
BENEFIT PENSION PLANS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS 
(1991); KELLY OLSEN & JACK VANDERHIE, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 
SPECIAL REPORT SR-33/EBRI ISSUE BRIEF NO. 190, DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN 
DOMINANCE GROWS ACROSS SECTORS AND EMPLOYER SIZES, WHILE MEGA DEFINED PLANS 
REMAIN STRONG (1997). 
 22. For a general description of defined contribution plan dynamics, see CANAN, supra 
note 18, at ¶¶ 3.11-.19. 
 23. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974). 
 24. See I.R.C. § 412. 
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payment of promised benefits.25 Employers who sponsor defined 
benefit plans must pay insurance premiums to the PBGC26 so that 
the PBGC can meet the financial obligations of retirement plans that 
become insolvent.27 Furthermore, ERISA makes plan sponsors liable 
for any shortfall in defined benefit plan assets when plans become in-
solvent.28 Thus, the employer using defined benefit plans bears a 
downside investment risk. In contrast, under a defined contribution 
plan, the employee bears all of the investment risk. In addition to 
ERISA, other legislative measures have placed additional administra-
tive burdens on the maintenance of defined benefit plans.29 As a con-
sequence, defined benefit plans have less potential appeal to employ-
ers.30 
Second, in addition to being less costly, less risky, and less ad-
ministratively burdensome to employers, defined contribution plans 
offer plan participants more flexibility and independence.31 More 
specifically, defined contribution plans often enable employees to 
make investment choices geared towards their own risk tolerance and 
 
 25. See ERISA §§ 4002-4003. 
 26. See id. § 4006(a)(3). 
 27. See id. § 4022(a) (the PBGC “shall guarantee [the] payment of all nonforfeitable 
benefits [under] a single employer plan”). 
 28. See id. § 4062. 
 29. For an overview of these legislative changes, see Edwin C. Hustead, Trends in Re-
tirement Income Plan Administrative Expenses, in DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS, supra 
note 17, at 167-70. In addition, Hustead comments that “[t]he cost of administering retire-
ment plans has continuously increased since the enactment of ERISA in 1974. This is particu-
larly true for defined benefit plans.” Id. at 175-76. 
 30. Even many of those employers who have been maintaining defined benefit plans 
have been replacing them with a special form of such plans known as a cash balance pension 
plan. See, e.g., Lee Sheppard, Pension Downsizing, Continued, 83 TAX NOTES 1107 (1999) 
(discussing the use of cash balance plans as a mechanism to avoid penalties associated with a 
pension plan termination); IBM Retools Pensions: New Plan Sweeping Corporate America, 
U.S.A. TODAY, May 4, 1999, at A1 (estimating that cash balance plans comprised over 12% of 
all defined benefit plans in 1998 and that this is a growing trend). Cash balance pension plans 
bear a close resemblance to defined contribution plans. One benefit treatise highlights their 
fundamental characteristics as follows: “Each participant has an account that is credited with a 
dollar amount that resembles an employer contribution and is generally determined as a per-
centage of pay. Each participant’s account is also credited with interest. The plan usually pro-
vides benefits in the form of a lump-sum distribution or annuity.” EMPLOYEE BENEFIT 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 111 (5th ed. 
1997). For an excellent discussion of the reasons that underlie the rising popularity of cash 
balance plans, see Anna M. Rappaport et al., Cash Balance Pension Plans, in POSITIONING 
PENSIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 29-44 (1997). 
 31. See Mitchell & Schieber, supra note 17, at 9. 
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individual idiosyncrasies. Given the mobility of today’s labor force, 
employees also have a greater sense of economic security in having 
control over their retirement destiny rather than having it rest with 
their long-forgotten former employers. 
Third, traditional defined benefit plans often compute pensions 
on a backloaded basis; that is, benefits are based on a specified per-
centage of an employee’s final salary. In contrast, defined contribu-
tion plan benefits are determined on a frontloaded basis—the earlier 
a contribution is made to a plan, the longer will be the time period 
of tax-free accumulation. Younger, highly mobile employees who do 
not envision working thirty or forty years for the same employer par-
ticularly value this frontloading feature. 
Fourth, various legislative initiatives have spurred the use of de-
fined contribution plans in the labor market. These initiatives include 
permitting the establishment of qualified plans that do not require 
(a) employer contributions (e.g., 401(k) plans)32 or (b) employer in-
volvement (e.g., IRAs).33 By the institution of various rollover op-
tions, Congress has also facilitated the transfer of retirement wealth 
between different qualified plans.34 
The dominance of defined contribution plans has a number of 
important public policy implications.35 Most relevant to this analysis 
is the inherent incentive to retain, rather than distribute, retirement 
plan wealth. In a defined benefit plan setting, distributions are typi-
cally limited to a single life annuity or, in the case of a married plan 
participant, a joint life annuity. That being the case, plan participants 
are often anxious to receive as much as possible as quickly as possible 
from their defined benefit plans because their benefits cease at death. 
The same philosophy, however, does not permeate the defined con-
tribution plan setting. This is because plan participants often have 
several distribution options, and they have no financial incentive to 
deplete their retirement account balances. To the contrary, their re-
tirement account balances continue to accumulate income tax free, 
which inures to their benefit rather than to the benefit of their em-
 
 32. See I.R.C. § 401(k). 
 33. See id. § 408. 
 34. See id. § 402(c). 
 35. These implications include various concerns such as risk, liquidity, and savings rates. 
These implications are analyzed in William G. Gale & Joseph M. Milano, Implications of the 
Shift to Defined Contribution Plans for Retirement Wealth Accumulation, in DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS, supra note 17, at 115-35. 
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ployer or other plan participants, as is the case in defined benefit 
plans. Moreover, upon the death of a plan participant, the retirement 
account balance is not extinguished, but, rather, it can be directed to 
the plan participant’s beneficiaries. 
B. Swelling Retirement Account Balances 
In the early 1980s, the number of defined contribution accounts 
surged. This, along with other factors (e.g., a blisteringly hot stock 
market and a lack of effective statutory coordination between the 
maximum defined benefit limitation and the maximum contribution 
limits for the various types of defined contribution plans), caused 
plan participants’ account balances and vested benefits to swell.36 
Their size and cost to the Treasury finally attracted congressional 
concern.37 
In 1986, Congress instituted two different taxes—an excise tax 
on “excess distributions”38 and an additional estate tax on “excess 
accumulations”39—in order to discourage the excessive accumulation 
of tax-favored retirement wealth.40 Each tax amounted to 15%.41 The 
introduction of these taxes had a significant chilling effect on plan 
participants’ funding efforts. Practitioners’ journals warned tax advis-
ers to caution plan participants not to be too ambitious in their shel-
tering attempts lest they risk exposure to these taxes.42 When it came 
to funding, moderation was the word; excesses were to be punished. 
This state of affairs lasted approximately a decade. The Small 
Business Job Protection Act of 1996 suspended application of the 
 
 36. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 328-32 (1984). 
 37. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 740 (1985). 
 38. These were distributions made to plan participants in excess of the greater of (i) 
$150,000 or (ii) the indexed amount referred to as the annual threshold amount. See I.R.C. § 
4980A(a) (repealed 1997). 
 39. In general, this amount was equal to the difference between the value of a hypo-
thetical annuity (i.e., a single life annuity based on the decedent’s age at his or her death mul-
tiplied by an amount equal to the annual threshold amount in effect in the year in which the 
decedent died) and the participant’s account balance. See id. § 4980A(d) (repealed 1997). 
 40. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1133(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2481 
(1986). For a detailed discussion of the purpose and operation of these excise taxes, see Bruce 
A. Wolk, The New Excise and Estate Taxes on Excess Retirement Plan Distributions and Accu-
mulations, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 987 (1987). 
 41. See I.R.C. § 4980A(a), (d) (repealed 1997). 
 42. See, e.g., Thomas A. Kirschbaum & Louis Kravitz, Minimizing Taxes on Excess Re-
tirement Distributions and Accumulations, 17 TAX’N FOR LAW. 216 (1989). 
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excise tax on excess distributions from 1997 through 1999.43 La-
beled “success taxes” by their critics, both the excise tax and the ad-
ditional estate tax were repealed the following year by the Taxpayer 
Relief Act of 1997.44 
The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 also repealed the 
so-called “§ 415(e) limitation.”45 This limitation applied to plan par-
ticipants who participated in a defined benefit plan and a defined 
contribution plan maintained by the same employer.46 Under this 
limitation, such plan participants could not simultaneously take full 
advantage of both the maximum permitted defined benefit under the 
defined benefit plan and the maximum permitted contribution to the 
defined contribution plan.47 
The repeal of the excise tax, the additional estate tax, and the 
§ 415(e) limitation has had an important effect in transforming the 
qualified plan landscape. Plan participants now have a green light to 
strive for as much asset growth as possible, even if the amount of 
wealth they contribute and the asset growth they achieve on such 
contributions far exceeds their (and their spouse’s) retirement needs. 
Plan participants now realize that even if they do not reap the harvest 
of their qualified plan wealth, their designated beneficiaries will, no 
matter how excessive the wealth.48 
 
 43. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1452(b), 
110 Stat. 1755, 1816 (effective after Dec. 31, 1999). The moratorium on the excess distribu-
tion excise tax was declared in hopes of raising revenue as taxpayers had added incentive to 
withdraw large amounts from their qualified plans. The theoretical justification offered was that 
the same legislation also repealed I.R.C. § 415(e), but not until the year 2000. This Code sec-
tion imposed a combined limit on benefits from defined benefit and defined contribution plans 
maintained by the same employer. See S. REP. NO. 104-281, at 91-92 (1996), reprinted in 
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1474, 1565-66. 
 44. Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1073, 111 Stat. 788, 948 (1997). In repealing both excise 
taxes, the Senate offered many justifications. “The Committee believes that the limits on con-
tributions and benefits applicable to each type of vehicle are sufficient limits on tax-deferred 
savings. Additional penalties are unnecessary, and may also deter individuals from saving. The 
excess accumulation and distribution taxes also inappropriately penalize favorable investment 
returns.” SENATE COMM. ON FIN., REVENUE RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1997, S. REP. NO. 
105-33, at 199-200 (1997). 
 45. Pub. Law No. 104-188, § 1452(a), 110 Stat. at 1816 (1996). 
 46. See I.R.C. § 415(e) (repealed 1996). 
 47. See id. 
 48. To be sure, there may be estate taxes due upon the death of the plan participant, but 
these would have been payable if the same wealth had been accumulated outside of the quali-
fied plan. The estate tax recovers some of the tax subsidy but still leaves much of it in the 
hands of the plan participant’s designated beneficiaries. 
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C. Introduction to Roth IRAs 
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 introduced a new qualified plan 
vehicle entitled the Roth IRA.49 Roth IRAs are similar to traditional 
IRAs in that contribution limits are comparable and assets held in 
both kinds of accounts grow income tax free.50 However, Roth IRAs 
are fundamentally different from traditional IRAs. First, only nonde-
ductible contributions can be made to Roth IRAs.51 Second, any 
“qualified distribution”52 from a Roth IRA is not includible in gross 
income. Third, the minimum distribution rules do not apply until 
the death of the account holder.53 
These differences have made Roth IRAs a new favorite among 
tax planners and their clients.54 There are many reasons for their 
popularity, but central among these is the fact that plan participants 
may keep their wealth housed in Roth IRAs longer than in any other 
retirement planning vehicle. This is because the minimum distribu-
tion rules are held in abeyance until the death of the plan partici-
pant.55 
There is a two thousand dollar annual limitation relating to con-
tributions made to Roth IRAs.56 This limitation, however, cloaks the 
tax-deferral opportunity Roth IRAs offer. If a plan participant’s ad-
justed gross income falls below certain limits, that participant has the 
opportunity to roll over amounts from a traditional IRA to a Roth 
IRA.57 Although a rollover to a Roth IRA from an employer-
provided qualified plan is not allowed, there is nothing to prevent a 
 
 49. Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 302(a), 111 Stat. at 825-28. 
 50. See I.R.C. § 408A(a). 
 51. See id. § 408A(c)(1). 
 52. A “qualified distribution” means any payment or distribution (a) made on or after 
the date on which the individual reaches age 59½, (b) made to a beneficiary (or to the estate of 
the individual) on or after the individual’s death, (c) attributable to the individual’s being dis-
abled, or (d) which is a qualified “special purpose” distribution (i.e., for any qualified first-time 
homebuyer to which I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(F) applies). See id. § 408(d)(4)(A). 
 53. See id. § 408A(c)(4). 
 54. See, e.g., Lynn Asinof, Stuck for a Gift Idea for a Favorite Child? A Surprising Choice 
May be a ROTH IRA, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1998, at C1; Laura Saunders, In Roth We Trust, 
FORBES, Apr. 20, 1998, at 466. For a stinging critique of the fiscal damage the use of Roth 
IRAs will wreak on the treasury, see Daniel Halperin, I Want a ROTH IRA for Xmas, 82 TAX 
NOTES 1567 (1998). 
 55. See supra note 53. 
 56. See § 408A(c)(2)(A). 
 57. See id. § 408A(c)(3)(B). 
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participant from first rolling over the qualified plan distribution into 
a traditional IRA and then making a rollover to a Roth IRA. Of 
course, the rollover from the traditional IRA to the Roth IRA is fully 
taxable, but if the resulting tax can be paid from other savings, the 
overall effect of the rollover is to permit even greater tax subsidies to 
flow to the plan participant. From a practical perspective, what this 
rollover ability means is that plan participants may contribute tre-
mendous amounts of wealth into Roth IRAs and stay the application 
of the minimum distribution rules, at least until their death. 
D. Miscellaneous Factors 
Aside from the changes mentioned in the prior three subsections, 
there are two other factors that make an evaluation of the minimum 
distribution rules particularly timely. First, over the past decade, 
marginal federal income tax rates have gradually risen from a low of 
28% in 1986 to where they are today at 39.6%. Higher income tax 
rates function as qualified plan fertilizer, creating added incentive for 
plan participants (particularly those whose incomes are taxed in the 
higher tax brackets) to shelter their otherwise taxable income by 
making qualified plan contributions.58 Moreover, the imposition of 
higher income tax rates entices plan participants to hold their accu-
mulated wealth in the tax-free sanctuary of qualified plans for as long 
as possible. 
A final reason to examine the minimum distribution rules now is 
the coming crisis in funding Social Security and Medicare. Many 
studies indicate that within the next two or three decades Social Se-
curity and Medicare will fall short of being able to sustain themselves 
financially.59 The question on the minds of commentators and politi-
cians alike is how to maintain their solvency. Given that the largest 
source of private wealth in the world is currently held by qualified 
plans, some commentators have raised the idea that plan assets 
and/or earnings on these assets should be taxed.60 
 
 58. See generally, Robert L. Clark & Sylvester J. Schieber, Factors Affecting Participation 
Rates and Contribution Levels in 401(k) Plans, in DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS, supra 
note 17, at 69-97. 
 59. See SOCIAL SEC. AND MEDICARE BDS. OF TRUSTEES, STATUS OF THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS 6-10 (1996). 
 60. Before the recent era of projected budget surpluses, some commentators and mem-
bers of the General Accounting Office and Congressional Budget Office maintained that the 
wealth of qualified plans should be used to help erase the federal deficit and simultaneously 
SOL-FIN.DOC 5/8/00  1:08 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
598 
E. Summary 
 The recent dominance of defined contribution plans; the re-
peal of the excise tax, additional estate tax, and limitations that once 
discouraged bountiful account balances; and the introduction of 
Roth IRAs have significantly altered the retirement planning land-
scape. The convergence of these events, along with relatively high 
income tax rates during a time when Social Security and Medicare 
are struggling to maintain their solvency, has catapulted the mini-
mum distribution rules to a new level of importance. As the baby 
boomer generation nears retirement, the tension between the natural 
desire of taxpayers to maximize tax deferral via qualified plans and 
the government’s need for tax revenue can only increase. 
III. MECHANICS OF THE MINIMUM DISTRIBUTION RULES 
This Section, which details the current system for regulating 
minimum distributions from qualified plans, is apt to prove challeng-
ing and frustrating. This reflects the fact that the minimum distribu-
tion rules themselves are inherently complex and difficult to compre-
hend. They are replete with special definitions, general rules, 
exceptions, and exceptions to the exceptions.61 But before delving 
into the rules, an example of their operation illustrates the extraordi-
nary benefit that tax-free compounding offers plan participants under 
the existing minimum distribution rules. 
A. An Example of the Minimum Distribution Rules 
This subsection illustrates the distribution effect under the cur-
rent minimum distribution rules, using data set forth in Table I. As-
sume that Owner, age seventy, has $1,000,000 in an IRA. Assume 
 
facilitate Social Security funding. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE 
DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS 299 (1994) (estimating that a 5% tax on invest-
ment income of pension plans and IRAs would raise revenue by $6.9 billion in year 1 and 
$13.6 billion in year 5); Alicia Munnell, Current Taxation of Qualified Pension Plans: Has the 
Time Come?, NEW ENG. ECON. REV. Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 12 (advocating a 15% tax on all em-
ployer contributions to pension and profit sharing arrangements as well as a 15% levy on the 
annual earnings of such arrangements). 
 61. In describing the difficulty of explaining the minimum distribution rules to friends, 
one author of this analysis makes the following comparison: Attempting to master the mini-
mum distribution rules is like going into a field and trying to catch grasshoppers in a glass jar. 
You have to make numerous attempts to catch one. Each successful catch makes the next more 
difficult, and when the hunt is over, what’s left in the glass jar is not exactly a pretty sight. 
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further that Owner has a Spouse, age sixty-six, and a Child, age 
forty. Owner and Spouse both live until age eighty-five and both 
elect not to recalculate life expectancies. When Owner dies, Spouse 
rolls over the account into Spouse’s own IRA, elects the term certain 
method, and names Child as the beneficiary. After Spouse’s death, 
Child is permitted to continue to receive distributions for twenty-
four more years. (The subsections that follow explain the nonrecal-
culation or “term certain” option as well as the reasons why Spouse 
and Child can continue to receive benefits under the IRA.) 
The example assumes a pre-tax investment return of 8% on the 
assets held by the IRA. This percentage times the “Beginning IRA 
Value” less the “Minimum Distribution” results in the “Ending IRA 
Value.” The example also assumes that the distributions out of the 
IRA are taxable at a combined federal and state income tax rate of 
43%. Finally, once out of the IRA, the example assumes that these 
proceeds grow at an after-tax investment return of 6.4% (reflecting 
the fact that some returns will be taxable at lower long-term capital 
gains rates). These assumptions produce the final column labeled 
“Accumulated Distributions.” 
When Owner dies, the minimum distribution drops from 
$153,417 to $68,079, and when Spouse dies at age eighty-five, the 
minimum distribution drops from $82,388 to $47,730. The reason 
for these drops will be explained shortly. If Child dies before age 
eighty-three, Child’s heirs can continue the same distribution 
scheme; there is no acceleration of distributions due to Child’s 
death. 
 
Table I 
Minimum Distribution Rules Illustration 
 
Year Owner’s 
Age 
Spouse’s 
Age 
Child’s 
Age 
Beginning 
IRA Value 
Minimum 
Distribution 
Ending 
IRA Value 
Accumulated 
Distributions 
1 70 66 40 $1,000,000  $44,444 $1,035,556 $25,333 
2 71 67 41 $1,035,556 $48,165 $1,070,235 $54,409 
3 72 68 42 $1,070,235 $52,207 $1,103,647 $87,649 
4 73 69 43 $1,103,647 $56,597 $1,135,341 $125,519 
5 74 70 44 $1,135,341 $61,370 $1,164,799 $168,533 
6 75 71 45 $1,164,799 $66,560 $1,191,423 $217,258 
7 76 72 46 $1,191,423 $72,207 $1,214,529 $272,321 
8 77 73 47 $1,214,529 $78,357 $1,233,335 $334,413 
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Year Owner’s 
Age 
Spouse’s 
Age 
Child’s 
Age 
Beginning 
IRA Value 
Minimum 
Distribution 
Ending 
IRA Value 
Accumulated 
Distributions 
9 78 74 48 $1,233,335 $85,058 $1,246,944 $404,298 
10 79 75 49 $1,246,944 $92,366 $1,254,333 $482,822 
11 80 76 50 $1,254,333 $100,347 $1,254,333 $570,920 
12 81 77 51 $1,254,333 $109,072 $1,245,607 $669,630 
13 82 78 52 $1,245,607 $118,629 $1,226,627 $780,105 
14 83 79 53 $1,226,627 $129,119 $1,195,638 $903,629 
15 84 80 54 $1,195,638 $140,663 $1,150,626 $1,041,640 
16 85 81 55 $1,150,626 $153,417 $1,089,259 $1,195,752 
17  82 56 $1,089,259 $68,079 $1,108,321 $1,311,085 
18  83 57 $1,108,321 $72,439 $1,124,548 $1,436,285 
19  84 58 $1,124,548 $77,555 $1,136,957 $1,572,414 
20  85 59 $1,136,957 $82,388 $1,145,525 $1,720,010 
21   60 $1,145,525 $47,730 $1,189,437 $1,857,296 
22   61 $1,189,437 $51,715 $1,232,877 $2,005,641 
23   62 $1,232,877 $56,040 $1,275,467 $2,165,944 
24   63 $1,275,467 $60,737 $1,316,768 $2,339,185 
25   64 $1,316,768 $65,838 $1,356,271 $2,526,420 
26   65 $1,356,271 $71,383 $1,393,390 $2,728,800 
27   66 $1,393,390 $77,411 $1,427,451 $2,947,567 
28   67 $1,427,451 $83,968 $1,457,679 $3,184,073 
29   68 $1,457,679 $91,105 $1,483,189 $3,439,783 
30   69 $1,483,189 $98,879 $1,502,964 $3,716,290 
31   70 $1,502,964 $107,355 $1,515,847 $4,015,325 
32   71 $1,515,847 $116,604 $1,520,511 $4,338,770 
33   72 $1,520,511 $126,709 $1,515,443 $4,688,675 
34   73 $1,515,443 $137,768 $1,498,911 $5,067,278 
35   74 $1,498,911 $149,891 $1,468,933 $5,477,022 
36   75 $1,468,933 $163,215 $1,423,232 $5,920,584 
37   76 $1,423,232 $177,904 $1,359,187 $6,400,906 
38   77 $1,359,187 $194,170 $1,273,752 $6,921,241 
39   78 $1,273,752 $212,292 $1,163,360 $7,485,207 
40   79 $1,163,360 $232,672 $1,023,757 $8,096,883 
41   80 $1,023,757 $255,939 $849,718 $8,760,969 
42   81 $849,718 $283,239 $634,456 $9,483,118 
43   82 $634,456 $317,228 $367,985 $10,270,857 
44   83 $367,985 $397,424 $0 $11,154,724 
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 What is striking about Table I is the last entry of the “Accumu-
lated Distributions” column. It should come as no surprise that the 
value of an investment can greatly multiply over a forty-four year pe-
riod given the effects of compounding at a steady rate of return. But 
compare this figure with what would have been accumulated had the 
$1,000,000 held in the IRA been initially distributed to Owner at 
the beginning of Year 1, i.e., had there been no further tax subsidy. 
Under the same rate-of-return and tax-rate assumptions, the 
$1,000,000 would have been immediately subject to a tax of 
$430,000, leaving a balance of $570,000. By the end of the forty-
four year period, this balance, rather than growing to $11,154,724 
as provided in Table I, would have instead grown to only 
$8,735,877. The difference between $11,154,724 and $8,735,877, 
$2,418,847, represents the cost to the government of permitting tax 
deferral during Owner’s retirement as well as over the time period 
during which Spouse and Child enjoyed Owner’s inheritance. 
Bluntly put, the roughly $2.4 million difference represents a rather 
hefty government grant to the Owner and his family. 
B. Lexicon of Important Terms Under the Minimum Distribution 
Rules 
This subsection introduces a set of technical terms central to the 
comprehension of the minimum distribution rules. 
1. Required beginning date 
Integral to mastery of the minimum distribution rules is the con-
cept known as the “required beginning date” (“RBD”). Distribu-
tions from a qualified plan (other than a Roth IRA) must commence 
on or prior to the RBD.62 Failure to make the requisite distribution 
by a participant’s RBD results in the imposition of a 50% excise tax, 
as described infra in subsection III.D. 63 
The RBD for plan participants who are still actively employed by 
their employer differs from those who are not. The RBD for any 
employee who is a participant in an employer’s qualified plan (and 
 
 62. Distributions from a Roth IRA may be suspended until the plan participant’s death, 
see I.R.C. § 408A(c)(5), at which time the minimum distribution rules then apply, see id. § 
401(a)(9)(B). 
 63. See id. § 4974. 
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who is not a 5% owner of the employer at any time)64 is April 1 fol-
lowing the year of retirement, if such employee retires after age 
70½.65 For all other plan participants, the RBD is April 1 of the year 
following the year they attain age 70½.66 
2. Minimum distribution amount 
Once plan participants determine their RBD, they must next de-
termine the amount the plan must distribute to them in order to 
avoid the imposition of the 50% excise tax. The minimum distribu-
tion amount must be paid each distribution calendar year.67 
In the case of a defined benefit plan, distributions are generally 
made in the form of annuity payments. Starting at the participant’s 
RBD, these annuity payments must be paid periodically at intervals 
not longer than one year using (1) the life expectancy of the plan 
participant or joint life and last survivor expectancy of the plan par-
ticipant and a designated beneficiary, if any, or (2) a period certain 
not longer than a life expectancy or joint life and last survivor expec-
tancy of the plan participant and a designated beneficiary, if any.68 To 
help ensure that the majority of the qualified plan assets inure to the 
benefit of the plan participant, annuity payments must conform to 
the minimum distribution incidental benefit requirement.69 This re-
quirement limits the period certain over which annuity payments can 
 
 64. The determination of whether or not an employee is a 5% owner is made in accor-
dance with I.R.C. § 416 but is made without regard to whether the plan is top-heavy. See id. § 
401(a)(9)(C)(ii)(I); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A B-2(d)(2), 52 Fed. Reg. 
28,070, 28,076 (1987). 
 65. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(C)(i)(II). To illustrate, suppose A is a rank-and-file employee 
of company X. If A participates in X’s defined contribution plan and retires at the end of 2001 
at the age of 75, a minimum distribution out of the plan would have to commence on or be-
fore April 1, 2002. 
 66. See id. § 401(a)(9)(C)(i)(I). To illustrate, suppose B retires at age 65 from company 
Y and he soon thereafter rolls over his retirement account balance into an IRA. If B turns 70½ 
in 2001, the minimum distribution out of the IRA would have to be made on or before April 
1, 2002. 
 67. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A F-1(b), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,084. The 
first distribution calendar year is the later of the year (a) a plan participant attains age 70½ or 
(b) the employee retires or becomes a 5% owner of the employer. See id. This rule applies on a 
plan-by-plan basis (i.e., a plan participant who participates in more than one qualified plan may 
have different distribution calendar years for each). See id. 
 68. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A F-3(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,084. 
 69. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A F-4A, 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,086; infra 
subsection III.B.4. 
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be made and the payment percentage that can inure to a designated 
beneficiary.70 Typically, upon the death of the plan participant (or 
the plan participant’s designated beneficiary), the plan’s annuity 
payment obligations cease.71 
In the case of a defined contribution plan (including IRAs), the 
process of determining the minimum distribution amount involves a 
simple computation involving a numerator and a divisor. Subject to 
certain adjustments,72 the numerator is the account balance on the 
last valuation date in the calendar year before a distribution calendar 
year.73 The divisor is generally the applicable life expectancy, which is 
the life expectancy of the plan participant (or the joint life and last 
survivor expectancy of the plan participant and the plan participant’s 
designated beneficiary):74 
 
Participant’s Account Balance 
Applicable Life Expectancy 
 
The applicable life expectancy is determined using the partici-
pant’s (and the designated beneficiary’s) age on the participant’s 
birthday (and the designated beneficiary’s birthday) in the calendar 
year prior to the participant’s RBD.75 Life expectancies are set forth 
in Tables V and VI of Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9.76 
Example: Owner turns age seventy on June 17, 1999, and 
he is married to Spouse, who is four years younger. Owner 
has an IRA with an account balance of $1,000,000 on De-
 
 70. To illustrate this latter point, consider what would happen if a plan participant 
names her granddaughter as the designated beneficiary and the granddaughter is 40 years jun-
ior to the plan participant. In this case, annual annuity payments to the granddaughter cannot 
exceed 54% of the amount of annual annuity payments made to the plan participant. The table 
that sets forth these percentage limitations is found in Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-2, 
Q&A 6(b)(2), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,100. 
 71. If distributions from a defined benefit plan are not in the form of an annuity, the 
plan participant’s benefit will be treated as an individual account for purposes of determining 
the minimum distribution amount. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A F-3(e), 52 
Fed. Reg. at 28,085. 
 72. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A F-5(b)-(c), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,086. 
For example, increasing for allocations of contributions or forfeitures and decreasing for distri-
butions. 
 73. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A F-5(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,026. 
 74. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A F-1(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,083. 
 75. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A E-1(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,080. 
 76. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A E-3 & 4, 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,081. 
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cember 31, 1998. Owner may determine his minimum dis-
tribution amount for 1999 (his first distribution calendar 
year) using his own life expectancy of sixteen years. This 
would produce a minimum distribution amount equal to 
$62,500 ($1,000,000/16). Alternatively, were Spouse 
named as Owner’s designated beneficiary, Owner could use 
their joint life expectancy of 22.5 years. This would produce 
a minimum distribution amount equal to $44,444 
($1,000,000/22.5) for the 1999 distribution calendar year. 
This is precisely how the minimum distribution amount was 
computed in Table I. 
Note that the larger the divisor, the smaller the minimum distri-
bution amount. The smaller the minimum distribution amount, the 
larger the retirement account balance that remains and the greater 
the income tax deferral. If the designated beneficiary is more than 
ten years younger than the plan participant and is not the plan par-
ticipant’s spouse, a smaller number known as the “applicable divisor” 
is used as the divisor instead of the applicable life expectancy.77 This 
is an application of the minimum distribution incidental benefit re-
quirement, which is discussed infra subsection III.B.4. 
Unless the terms of a plan provide otherwise or a plan participant 
elects to the contrary, a plan participant’s life expectancy (or the joint 
life and last survivor expectancy of the plan participant and spouse) is 
recalculated annually.78 The Treasury regulation tables supply the 
applicable life expectancy or joint life expectancies, as the case may 
be, based on the participant’s and spouse’s (if applicable) attained 
ages as of their birthdays in that distribution calendar year.79 Alterna-
tively, a plan participant may elect not to have his (or his spouse’s) 
life expectancy recalculated.80 Instead, the life expectancy would be 
decreased by one each year to determine the minimum distribution 
amount. This is known as the “term certain method.”81 In the case 
 
 
 
 77. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-2, Q&A 4 & 5, 52 Fed. Reg at 28,098-99. 
 78. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A E-8(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,082; See 
generally, David Johnson, Recalculating the Life Expectancy Election, TR. & EST., Nov. 1990, 
at 8. 
 79. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A E-1(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,080; supra 
text accompanying notes 75-76. 
 80. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, Q&A E-7(b), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,082. 
 81. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9712032 (Mar. 21, 1997). 
SOL-FIN.DOC 5/8/00  1:08 PM 
587] Minimum Distribution Rules and Their Critical Role 
 605 
of a designated beneficiary other than the surviving spouse, the term 
certain method must be used to determine the divisor.82 
Example: Using the example in Table I, the joint life expec-
tancy of Owner and Spouse in the first distribution year (Year 
1) is 22.5. Since in this example the participant has elected 
not to recalculate life expectancies, each year the divisor will 
be reduced by one. Thus, in Year 2 it is 21.5, and the mini-
mum distribution is $48,165 ($1,035,556/21.5). By Year 
16, the year of Owner’s death, the divisor is 7.5. What hap-
pens after Owner’s death is discussed below. 
3. Designated beneficiary 
In general, having a designated beneficiary allows the plan par-
ticipant to use the joint life and last survivor tables to compute the 
minimum distribution amount, resulting in smaller minimum distri-
bution amounts and maximizing income deferral. For purposes of 
the minimum distribution rules, only individuals (and individual 
beneficiaries of certain kinds of trusts)83 may be designated benefici-
aries.84 The terms of a plan may name the designated beneficiary, or, 
 
 82. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(D); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A E-8(b), 52 
Fed. Reg. at 28,083. However, the incidental benefit requires a recalculation of the designated 
beneficiary’s life expectancy, at least until the death of plan participant. This rule is reflected in 
the tables under Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-2, Q&A 6, 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,099-100. 
 83. If a trust is named as beneficiary of a plan participant, all beneficiaries of the trust 
may be treated as having been designated as beneficiaries of the participant. See Prop. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A D-5(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,080 (as amended by 62 Fed. Reg. 
67,780, 67,783 (1997)). This will happen if, as of the later of the date on which the trust is 
named as a beneficiary of the participant or the participant’s required beginning date, and as of 
all subsequent periods during which the trust is named as a beneficiary, the four following re-
quirements are met: (1) the trust is a valid trust under state law, or would be but for the fact 
that there is no corpus; (2) the trust is irrevocable or will, by its terms, become irrevocable 
upon the death of the plan participant; (3) the beneficiaries of the trust are identifiable from 
the trust instrument; and (4) the plan administrator must be provided with either a copy of the 
trust instrument or a certified list of all beneficiaries (including contingent and remainderman 
beneficiaries with a description of the conditions on their entitlement). See id. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, 
Q&A D-5(b), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,080 (as amended by 62 Fed. Reg. at 67,783). In addition, 
within nine months after the plan participant’s death, the trustee must provide the plan admin-
istrator with a copy of the trust or provide the plan administrator with a final list of trust bene-
ficiaries (including contingent and remainderman beneficiaries with a description of the condi-
tions on their entitlement). See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A D-7, 62 Fed. Reg. 
67,780, 67,784 (1997). 
 84. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A D-2A(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,079. 
Note that the members of a class of beneficiaries capable of expansion or contraction (e.g., the 
participant’s children) will be treated as being identifiable if it is possible at the applicable time 
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if the terms of the plan provide, plan participants may name an indi-
vidual or trust as a beneficiary.85 For purposes of computing the 
minimum distribution amount, the participant’s designated benefici-
ary will ordinarily be determined at the earlier of either the partici-
pant’s death or as of the participant’s RBD.86 If there is more than 
one designated beneficiary, the one with the shortest life expectancy 
will be used to determine the required minimum distribution 
amount.87 
4. Minimum distribution incidental benefit (“MDIB”) requirement 
The primary purpose of a qualified plan must be to provide re-
tirement benefits or deferred compensation.88 Any other benefit 
must be incidental.89 
Basically, under the MDIB requirement for computing the appli-
cable life expectancy, any nonspouse who is a designated beneficiary 
is treated as being no more than ten years younger than the partici-
pant.90 In the case of defined benefit plans, the MDIB functions in a 
similar fashion by requiring that distributions made to plan partici-
pants not be too small relative to those that are to be made to their 
designated beneficiaries.91 
There are two important limitations on the application of the 
MDIB requirement. First, if the participant’s spouse is the desig-
 
to identify the class member with the shortest life expectancy. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 
1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A D-2(a)(1), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,079. 
 85. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A D-2(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,079. 
 86. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A D-3(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,079. 
 87. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A E-5(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,081. 
 88. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(as amended in 1976); supra note 11 and accompa-
nying text. 
 89. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(G); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-2, 52 Fed. Reg. at 
28,098. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the Treasury Department had set forth a MDIB 
requirement in a number of revenue rulings interpreting the term “incidental” as applied to 
death benefits. See supra note 14. The purpose of this requirement was to limit the portion of 
the participant’s benefit that would be paid after the participant’s death. The policy justifica-
tion for tax subsidized death benefits is much weaker than for subsidized retirement benefits. 
The MDIB requirement has now been made a part of the minimum distribution requirements. 
Thus, distributions must satisfy not only the regular minimum distribution rules discussed 
above but also the MDIB requirement as well. 
 90. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(G); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-2, 52 Fed. Reg. at 
28,098. 
 91. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-2, Q&A 6(b)(2), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,100. 
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nated beneficiary, the MDIB requirement does not apply.92 Second, 
after the death of the participant, the MDIB requirement no longer 
applies, and the applicable life expectancy that would have been used 
absent the MDIB requirement is then used to compute the mini-
mum distribution amount.93 As the following example illustrates, the 
latter restriction has significant income tax deferral repercussions. 
Example: Recall from the example in Table I that when 
Owner dies in Year 16 and Spouse rolls over the IRA into 
his/her own, Spouse names Child as the designated benefici-
ary. Without the MDIB requirement, the minimum distribu-
tion divisor for Year 17 could be based on Spouse’s and 
Child’s joint life expectancy as of that year, which under the 
Treasury’s tables is twenty-eight. But since Child is more 
than ten years younger than Spouse, the MDIB requirement 
limits the divisor to sixteen, the “applicable divisor” in the 
Treasury’s table.94 Thus, the minimum distribution for Year 
17 is $68,079 ($1,089,259/16). When Spouse dies in Year 
20, distributions in future years are no longer subject to the 
MDIB requirement. In Year 21, the remainder of the appli-
cable life expectancy is twenty-eight (the Child’s and 
Spouse’s original joint and survivor life expectancy when 
minimum distributions commenced to Spouse) less four (the 
number of years that elapsed from the Spouse’s first distribu-
tion year to the date of Spouse’s death), and the minimum 
distribution is $47,730 ($1,145,525/24). The divisor is re-
duced by one in each of the next twenty-three years. 95 
 
 92. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-2, Q&A 7(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,100. 
 93. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A F-3A(b)(1), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,085. 
 94. The MDIB requirement establishes a table specifying a limit on the divisor, which 
changes each year based on the plan participant’s age during the distribution year. See Prop. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-2, Q&A-4, 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,098-99. 
 95. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A E-8(c), Exs. 1 & 2, F-3A(b)(1), 52 
Fed. Reg. at 28,083, 28,085. To illustrate the more powerful effects this rule has when a plan 
participant names an even younger designated beneficiary, consider the following fact pattern. 
Assume that an employee, age 70, names his grandchild, age 10, as his beneficiary under his 
profit-sharing plan. The employee elects installment payments over their joint life expectancy, 
which is 71.8 using Table VI of Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9. This would permit the employee to re-
ceive as little as 1/71.8 of his account for the first distribution year. The MDIB requirement 
limits the divisor. For an employee age 70 the divisor is 26.2, which is essentially just the joint 
life expectancy of a 70 year old and a 60 year old. The payments can still be spread out over 
the joint life expectancy of the employee and the grandchild, but they will be considerably 
skewed toward the earlier years when the employee is more likely to be alive. Once the em-
ployee dies, however, the MDIB requirement no longer applies. Thus, if the employee dies at 
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Understanding these definitions will clarify the discussion that 
follows of how the minimum distribution rules operate. 
C. Application of the Minimum Distribution Rules 
Distributions made during the life of the plan participant may be 
made before or after the participant’s RBD. Distributions made after 
the death of the plan participant will occur either before or after the 
participant’s RBD. 
1. Distributions during the life of the plan participant 
a. Before RBD. In general, the minimum distribution rules do 
not apply with respect to distributions made prior to the participant’s 
RBD.96 Plan participants may, therefore, prolong the time period be-
fore which distributions have to be made from their qualified plans. 
For example, in the case of the active octogenarian who participates 
in his employer’s qualified plan, distributions from such a plan do 
not have to commence until the employee retires, say at age ninety. 
Plan participants are thus free to capitalize upon the tax-free status of 
their qualified plans. 
b. After RBD. In order not to jeopardize a qualified plan’s tax-
exempt status, or to prevent the plan participant from incurring a 
50% excise tax, distributions of the minimum distribution amount 
from a qualified plan must commence at the participant’s RBD.97 
Subject to the MDIB requirement, distributions may be made (1) 
over the life of such participant, (2) over a term certain that does not 
exceed the actuarial life expectancy of the plan participant, (3) over 
the lives of the participant and a designated beneficiary, or (4) over a 
term certain that does not exceed the actuarial life expectancy of the 
plan participant and a designated beneficiary.98 
2. Distributions after the death of the plan participant 
a. Death of plan participant before the RBD. If the plan partici-
pant dies prior to the RBD, distributions must be made under one of 
 
age 72 1/2 (during the third distribution year), the payments to the grandchild can be spread 
out over the remainder of their joint life expectancy, i.e., 71.8 less 3, or 68.8 years. See id. 
 96. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A B-3A, 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,077. 
 97. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9). 
 98. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A B-1(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,076. 
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two methods. The first method is the five-year rule under § 
401(a)(9)(B)(ii). This method requires that the entire interest of the 
participant be distributed within five years of the participant’s death 
(i.e., on or before December 31 of the fifth calendar year after the 
participant’s death)99 regardless of to whom or to what entity the 
distribution is made.100 
The second method is the exception to the five-year rule under § 
401(a)(9)(B)(iii). This method, which presumes that the plan par-
ticipant has named a designated beneficiary, requires that any portion 
of a participant’s interest that is payable to (or for the benefit of) a 
designated beneficiary be distributed, commencing within one year 
of the plan participant’s death (i.e., on or before December 31 of the 
first calendar year after a plan participant’s death)101 and extending 
over the life of such beneficiary (or over a period certain not extend-
ing beyond the life expectancy of such beneficiary).102 
If the participant’s spouse is the designated beneficiary, the sur-
viving spouse has two options. Under the first option, distributions 
may commence on or before the later of (1) December 31 of the 
calendar year immediately following the calendar year in which the 
plan participant died or (2) December 31 of the calendar year in 
which the plan participant would have attained age 70½.103 Under 
the second option, the surviving spouse may elect to roll over the 
plan participant’s account to an IRA (assuming this is a permissible 
distribution option),104 thus deferring distributions until April 1 of 
the calendar year following the year in which the surviving spouse at-
tains age 70½. In addition, the surviving spouse has the ability to 
name new designated beneficiaries.105 
 
 
 99. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A C-2, 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,077. 
 100. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(B)(ii); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A C-1(a), 52 
Fed. Reg. at 28,077. To illustrate, suppose A, a participant of Plan X, dies on July 15, 2000, at 
age 65 and his designated beneficiary is his estate. In accordance the five-year rule, the entire 
account balance of Plan X must be distributed to A’s estate by Dec. 31, 2005. 
 101. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A C-3(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,077-78. 
 102. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(B)(iii); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A C-1(a), 52 
Fed. Reg. at 28,077. 
 103. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A C-3(b), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,075. 
 104. See I.R.C. § 402(c). 
 105. The ability to name a new designated beneficiary is an important tax deferral device. 
The selection of a designated beneficiary who is younger than the plan participant (or his or 
her spouse) has the direct effect of reducing the minimum distribution amount. 
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b. Death of the plan participant after RBD. In general, if a plan 
participant dies after the participant’s RBD, an “at least as rapidly” 
rule applies. That is, the account balance of the plan participant must 
be distributed “at least as rapidly” as the method being used for dis-
tribution as of the date of the participant’s death.106 How this rule 
applies and its implications depend upon whether the participant has 
named a designated beneficiary. 
If the participant fails to name a designated beneficiary (e.g., the 
plan participant names his estate as the beneficiary) and if the partici-
pant is recalculating his life expectancy, the entire account balance 
must be distributed by December 31 of the year following the par-
ticipant’s death.107 Alternatively, if there is no designated beneficiary 
and the participant had elected the term certain method, distribu-
tions may be made over the remaining designated period.108 
If the participant dies after the participant’s RBD and the partici-
pant has named a designated beneficiary, the remaining portion of 
such interest must be distributed to the designated beneficiary at 
least as rapidly as under the distribution method being used as of the 
date of the participant’s death.109 Because the MDIB requirement, 
however, does not apply after the participant’s death, the applicable 
divisor no longer applies. Instead, the divisor used to determine the 
minimum distribution amount is either (1) the joint life expectancy 
of the plan participant and the designated beneficiary at the com-
mencement of distributions less the number of years that have 
elapsed since the RBD (where the plan participant had elected the 
term certain method) or (2) the designated beneficiary’s life expec-
tancy at the commencement of distributions less the number of years 
that have elapsed since the RBD (where the plan participant had 
used the recalculation method).110 
If the participant names the participant’s surviving spouse as the 
designated beneficiary, the surviving spouse has two options. Under 
the first option, the surviving spouse can continue to receive mini-
mum distributions under the schedule in place at the participant’s 
 
 106. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(B)(i). 
 107. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A E-8(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,082. 
 108. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A B-4, F-3A(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,077, 
28,085. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-2, Q&A 7(a), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,100. 
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death.111 Under the second option, the surviving spouse may roll 
over the participant’s account balance into an IRA (assuming this is a 
permissible distribution option).112 In addition, the surviving spouse 
has the ability to name new designated beneficiaries. (The second 
option was used by Spouse in the Table I example, which resulted in 
the deferral of distributions far beyond the joint lives of Owner and 
Spouse.) 
D. Failure to Comply with the Minimum Distribution Rules and the 
Imposition of the 50% Excise Tax 
To encourage compliance with the minimum distribution rules, 
Congress has instituted a 50% excise tax on the difference between 
the amount of the minimum distribution and the amount, if any, 
that was actually distributed to the plan participant.113 However, the 
tax can be waived if a plan participant can show that the participant’s 
failure to receive the entire minimum distribution is due to reason-
able error and reasonable steps are instituted to remedy the short-
fall.114 
IV. EVALUATION OF THE MINIMUM DISTRIBUTION RULES 
An analysis of the minimum distribution rules reveals their flaws. 
The rules are administratively daunting, making compliance difficult 
and costly, especially given the large number of taxpayers affected. At 
the same time, the rules are inequitable because benefits inure pri-
marily to high-income earners. 
A. Administration of the Minimum Distribution Rules 
1. Complexity 
By any standard, the minimum distribution rules are horren-
dously complex. First, the rules require mastery of special terms of 
 
 111. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, Q&A E-7(c), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,082. 
 112. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9534027 (Aug. 25, 1995) (under the authority of Prop. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.408-8, Q&A A-4(b), 52 Fed. Reg. at 28102-03, the surviving spouse may 
claim the participant’s IRA as the surviving spouse’s own). 
 113. See I.R.C. § 4974(a). To illustrate, suppose A is a participant in Plan Z. If A’s mini-
mum distribution from Plan Z is $10,000 and A withdraws $7,000, then the excise tax would 
be equal to $1,500 (.50 x ($10,000 - $7,000)). 
 114. See id. § 4974(d). 
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art that have the aura of mystical incantations. People who speak in 
minimum-distribution-rule parlance have a language of their own. 
Their conversations are punctuated by cryptic phrases, where legions 
of acronyms abound.115 Outsiders to the minimum-distribution-rule 
expert clique are rendered linguistically impotent, unable to commu-
nicate and reliant on the expertise of others. 
Second, the minimum distribution rules involve numbing detail. 
Unlike many Code provisions that provide a general rule with one or 
two exceptions, the minimum distribution rules provide a series of 
general rules that are riddled with numerous exceptions and excep-
tions to those exceptions. Indeed, the regulations that elaborate on 
the technical meaning of the statute span over forty single-spaced 
pages.116 The outcome of this complexity is that plan participants, tax 
planners, and brokerage houses all too often commit inadvertent 
planning errors.117 
Finally, the minimum distribution rules spawn additional com-
plexity in other areas of tax planning. Consider, for example, the 
plight of married taxpayers who participate in qualified plans. A mar-
ried individual may wish to establish trusts that qualify for the estate 
tax marital deduction for the benefit of the surviving spouse. In or-
der to qualify for the estate tax marital deduction, the terms of such 
trusts must provide that the surviving spouse annually receives all 
trust income.118 Coordinating the plan participant’s dual objectives 
of satisfying the estate tax marital deduction and minimum distribu-
tion rules is not an easy task. It requires an extraordinary amount of 
careful (and expensive) tax planning involving the use of special trust 
provisions and the issuance of special instructions to plan administra-
tors.119 Plan participants who already had a hard time comprehend-
 
 115. For example, you might hear a minimum-distribution-rule pundit say, “You’re near-
ing your RBD. Did you receive your minimum distribution during this distribution calendar 
year?” Alternatively, you might hear another such pundit say, “I’m using the recalculation 
method based on my ALE and my spouse is using the term certain method. We have chosen a 
qualifying trust as our contingent designated beneficiary.” 
 116. See 6 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶¶ 17,724-17,725 (2000). 
 117. See, e.g., Lynn Asinof, Oops . . . How a Variety of Basic Foul-Ups Are Bedeviling the 
Beneficiaries of IRAs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 1999, at C1; Mary Rowland, Who’s Advising Fi-
nancial Advisors?, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1993, at B2. 
 118. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii). 
 119. The Service has fortunately issued guidance in this perplexing and evolving area of 
the law. See Rev. Rul. 2000-2, 2000-3 I.R.B. 305. The ruling clarifies that the trustee of the 
marital deduction trust (usually what is known as a QTIP trust) does not have to withdraw 
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ing the dynamics of their estate plans undoubtedly find that the 
minimum distribution rules add another unwelcome and cumber-
some dimension of complexity.120 
2. Enforceability by the Internal Revenue Service 
The complex nature of the minimum distribution rules along 
with the absence of any congressionally mandated oversight re-
quirements makes enforcement by the Service difficult.121 For exam-
ple, plan participants make supposedly irrevocable elections in de-
termining their minimum distribution amounts, such as whether to 
recalculate life expectancies and who is named as the designated 
beneficiary. Despite the importance of these elections, the Service re-
ceives no independent verification of what they are in the form of in-
 
IRA income annually. All that is required is that the spouse have the power, exercisable annu-
ally, to compel the trustee to withdraw the IRA income and pay it to the spouse.  
 Note that the trustee must still withdraw the required minimum distribution amount. The 
issue considered in the ruling is whether the trustee has to withdraw even more if the IRA in-
come exceeds this amount. It is therefore crucial to draft the trust to specifically give the 
spouse the requisite power over the IRA income. 
 120. See Marcia Chadwick Holt, Retirement Planning: A Practical Guide to Making the 
Tough Choices, 29 MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN., ¶¶ 400-410.10 (1995); Louis A. Mezzullo, 
Serving an Ace Without a Foot Fault When Planning for Qualified Plan Benefits: Spousal Roll-
overs, Excise Taxes, Charitable Bequests, and IRAs, 32 MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN., ¶¶ 1100.1-
1103.6 (1998). 
 121. See Jay A. Soled, When Will Congress Police the Minimum Distribution Rules, 86 TAX 
NOTES 1003 (2000). 
 The complexity of the minimum distribution rules has perhaps led the Service to embrace 
taxpayer-friendly positions in developing responses to several private ruling requests. Consider, 
for example, the outcome reached in Private Letter Ruling 199915063 (Apr. 16, 1999). In 
this ruling, when the plan participant reached his RBD, he named his designated beneficiaries. 
This designation gave the plan participant the opportunity to use the dual life expectancy tables 
in determining the minimum distribution amount. The plan participant, however, instead 
elected to have the minimum distribution amounts computed using only his recalculated life 
expectancy. Upon the plan participant’s death, in accordance with the regulations, the plan 
participant’s life expectancy was reduced to zero. Despite this fact, the Service ruled that the 
“at least as rapidly rule” would serve to penalize the plan participant just because he had cho-
sen to take distributions in a more rapid fashion than he was required. Instead, because the 
plan participant had timely chosen his designated beneficiary by his RBD, “the applicable life 
expectancy [for purposes of determining the minimum distribution amounts] is the life expec-
tancy of the designated beneficiary.” Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199915063 (Apr. 16, 1999). This ruling 
and others like it show incredible tolerance on the part of the Service. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
199908063 (Feb. 26, 1999) (surviving spouse is deemed designated beneficiary where IRA 
named estate as the beneficiary and surviving spouse was the sole beneficiary of the estate). 
This tolerance is probably attributable to the fact that the Service empathizes with the plight of 
plan participants and their advisors in comprehending the complexities of the minimum distri-
bution rules. 
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formation returns. This is in stark contrast to other areas of the law 
where the issuance of information returns plays a vital role in ensur-
ing taxpayer compliance.122 This absence of direct oversight means 
that plan participants who supposedly make irrevocable, yet ill-
conceived, elections may make changes with virtual impunity. 
3. Tactics targeted to maximize tax deferral 
The significant economic benefits of tax deferral motivate plan 
participants and their advisors to exploit the weaknesses of the mini-
mum distribution rules.123 Often, however, plan participants fail to 
comprehend the full consequences associated with the adoption of 
such strategies, fostering plan participant confusion and frustration. 
Such strategies for prolonged tax deferral incur costs not only to so-
ciety in the form of lost revenue but also to plan participants in the 
form of hefty legal and actuarial fees. Adopting these strategies also 
contributes to the difficulties of making the minimum distribution 
rules easier to administer. The following three subsections illustrate 
some of the tactics used to maximize tax deferral. 
a. Naming the plan participant’s children as the designated benefi-
ciaries and the plan participant’s spouse as the contingent beneficiary. 
This allows required minimum distributions to be based on the joint 
life expectancy of the plan participant and a child (subject, of course, 
to the MDIB requirement) rather than the shorter joint life expec-
tancy of the participant and the spouse. If the participant predeceases 
the spouse, the children would be expected to disclaim their interest 
in the plan, allowing the surviving spouse to roll it over into an IRA 
and name new designated beneficiaries, presumably the very same 
children. 
b. Continuing employment. To gain an extra decade or two of in-
come tax deferral, plan participants may continue their employment, 
perhaps through a part-time employment arrangement and thereby 
postpone their RBD. 
 
 
 122. See generally, Piroska Soos, Self-Employed Evasion and Tax Withholding: A Com-
parative Study and Analysis of the Issues, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 107 (1990); American Bar 
Association, Report of the Second Invitational Conference on Income Tax Compliance, 42 TAX 
LAW 705 (1989); American Bar Association, Report and Recommendation on Taxpayer Com-
pliance, 41 TAX LAW 329 (1988). 
 123. For an illustration of the significance of the tax dollars that can be saved, see supra 
Table I and accompanying text. 
SOL-FIN.DOC 5/8/00  1:08 PM 
587] Minimum Distribution Rules and Their Critical Role 
 615 
c. Rolling over account balances. In certain instances, plan partici-
pants who have made poor beneficiary designation choices (e.g., 
naming their estate as the designated beneficiary) can rectify these 
errors—albeit at an immediate tax cost—by rolling over their ac-
count balances into newly formed Roth IRAs that permit them to 
name new designated beneficiaries. 
B. Equity of the Minimum Distribution Rules 
Aside from administrative difficulties, the minimum distribution 
rules exacerbate a weakness that is already part of our system of tax-
favored retirement saving: the tax benefits are skewed toward high-
income individuals. The tax-favored treatment of qualified plans 
costs the Treasury billions of dollars annually and constitutes the sin-
gle largest tax expenditure of the federal budget.124 Despite these 
costs, study after study indicates that those who capitalize most on 
the advantages of tax deferral are the highly compensated.125 The 
minimum distribution rules perpetuate this inequity by allowing the 
account balances of the highly compensated to grow virtually un-
abated over a significant time period, far beyond the lifetime of the 
plan participant. 
During retirement, wealthy plan participants are more likely to 
be able to draw upon financial resources other than their qualified 
plans, thus prolonging plan distributions and resultant income taxes 
for many years. Their designated beneficiaries (children, grandchil-
dren, or great-grandchildren) are likewise apt to have alternative fi-
nancial resources other than qualified plan assets and could afford to 
prolong plan distributions as long as possible. In contrast, plan par-
ticipants who are less financially fortunate often tap their qualified 
 
 
 124. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-13-99, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2000-2004, at 23 (1999) (for fiscal year 2000, the tax ex-
penditure for the net exclusion for pension contributions and earnings is estimated to be $93.2 
billion). 
 125. See David E. Bloom & Richard B. Freeman, The Fall in Private Plan Coverage in the 
United States, 82 AMER. ECON. REV. 539 (1992) (showing how less educated males experi-
enced particularly severe declines in pension coverage in the 1980s); Craig J. Langstraat, The 
Individual Retirement Account: Retirement Help for the Masses, or Another Tax Break for the 
Wealthy?, 60 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 437 (1986) (arguing that IRA provisions favor wealthy tax-
payers); Bruce A. Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions 
Confront Economic Realty, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 430-31 (1984) (“[L]ow paid employees . . . 
may be less willing to save than others because of pressing current consumption needs.”). 
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plans sooner and commonly exhaust plan assets well before their 
death.126 
Consider the example in Table I, supra Section III.A. By the 
time Child inherits the IRA, there is already $1.7 million accumu-
lated outside the IRA, making it more likely that Child can afford to 
take out only the minimum required distribution each year. Now 
suppose that Spouse’s designated beneficiary had not been Child, 
but instead Grandchild, age two in Year 19. The joint and last survi-
vor life expectancy of Spouse and Grandchild is 76.6 years, which al-
lows distributions to be spread out over nearly ninety-three years 
from Owner’s RBD.127 
There seems little justification for a system that, on one hand, al-
lows the highly compensated to amass significant tax-favored wealth 
on the theory that it was needed for retirement but, on the other 
hand, permits them to perpetuate their own financial dynasties as this 
wealth moves across multiple generations, retaining its tax-favored 
status.128 
V. PROPOSALS TO RENDER THE MINIMUM DISTRIBUTION RULES 
MORE EFFECTIVE 
This analysis sets forth two alternative proposals, each of which is 
based upon the following simple proposition: the benefits of tax de-
ferral should inure solely to plan participants (and their spouses). The 
notion that such benefits should inure primarily to participants and 
spouses is already well embedded in the MDIB requirement and 
minimum distribution rule legislative history.129 But unless one be-
 
 126. See Angela E. Chang, Tax Policy, Lump-Sum Pension Distributions, and Household 
Savings, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 235 (1996) (presenting empirical evidence that those with low in-
comes are less likely to roll over qualified plan distributions than are the highly compensated). 
 127. The minimum distribution rules are inequitable from another perspective. They 
cause otherwise similarly situated plan participants to bear different tax burdens. This inequity 
is due to such factors as the governing terms found in qualified plan documents that limit dis-
tribution modes and marital circumstances that necessitate the use of marital trusts, both of 
which can curtail deferral opportunities. 
 128. See John A. Herbers, Leveraging an IRA’s Tax Deferral Into Multi-Generational 
Wealth, TR. & EST., Jan. 1997, at 10. 
 129. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
TAX REFORM OF 1986, at 710.  
Uniform minimum distribution rules which establish the permissible periods over 
which benefits from any tax-favored retirement arrangement may be distributed en-
sure that plans are used to fulfill the purpose that justifies their tax-favored status— 
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lieves that all saving should be tax-favored (which would essentially 
transform our income tax system into a consumption tax system), 
there seems little justification for extending the tax benefits to other 
beneficiaries. 
These proposals, therefore, aim at protecting plan participants’ 
(and their spouses’) standard of living during their retirement years 
while simultaneously curtailing the ability of their beneficiaries to 
gain unwarranted tax benefits. Both proposals also aim to make the 
minimum distribution rules simpler and more equitable.130 
A. Proposal One: Modify the Existing Minimum Distribution Rules 
1. A joint life expectancy should be used only if the designated 
beneficiary is a spouse 
Under this proposal, required minimum distributions would 
generally be based only on the life expectancy of the plan participant. 
The only exception to this rule would be if the plan participant’s 
spouse were the designated beneficiary, in which event minimum dis-
tributions would be based on the joint and survivor life expectancy 
of the plan participant and the spouse.131 
2. In the case of defined contribution plans and IRAs, life expectancies 
must be recalculated 
When determining their minimum distribution amounts, plan 
participants (and their spouses) would have to use the recalculation 
method rather than the term certain method. This means that the 
minimum distribution for a year is determined simply by dividing the 
 
replacement of a participant’s preretirement income stream at retirement—rather 
than for the indefinite deferral of tax on a participant’s accumulation under the plan.  
Id. 
 130. Adoption of either of these proposals would have the immediate effect of signifi-
cantly increasing the number of taxable lump sum distributions. In recognition of this fact and 
to make these proposals more politically palatable, this analysis advocates returning to a system 
of income averaging for such lump sum distributions. 
 131. The complex MDIB requirements (and their 10 single-spaced pages in the regula-
tions) would no longer be necessary, since they only apply when the life expectancy of a non-
spousal designated beneficiary is used. Note that participants could name anyone as the actual 
beneficiary of the plan, but, unless the designated beneficiary were a spouse, minimum distri-
butions could only be made over the life of the plan participant. Thus, plans would not be 
permitted to pay survivor annuities to anyone other than a spouse. 
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account balance by the current life expectancy of the plan participant 
(or the participant and a spouse). The relevant life expectancies are 
already set forth in Treasury Regulation tables.132 The only informa-
tion needed to use the table is the attained age of the plan partici-
pant (and the spouse, if the spouse is the designated beneficiary). 
Determining a new life expectancy each year guarantees that the 
minimum distribution requirement will not force the plan account to 
be liquidated prior to the death of the plan participant and the 
spouse.133 
3. Plan administrators would be responsible for distributing minimum 
distribution amounts 
This proposal would make plan administrators responsible for 
annually distributing minimum distribution amounts from all plans 
(including traditional IRAs and Roth IRAs).134 In satisfying the 
minimum distribution requirement, IRA owners could no longer 
pick and choose between and among their IRAs.135 To enforce com-
pliance, plan administrators would be liable for an excise tax (equal, 
for example, to 20% of what they fail to distribute) for any failure to 
comply with this distribution mandate. 
As more and more retirement savings find their way into IRAs 
via rollovers, the need to make IRA custodians responsible for mak-
ing minimum distributions has become more urgent. Strong policy 
grounds support the change. First, plan administrators likely have 
better resources to monitor compliance with the minimum distribu-
 
 132. See Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9, Tables V (one life) & VI (two lives) (1999). 
 133. It also means that at the death of one spouse minimum distributions will be in-
creased since they will be based solely on the life of the survivor. 
 134. Currently, only administrators of employer-provided plans have responsibility for 
ensuring that the plans they administer distribute the minimum distribution amounts to plan 
participants. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9). A plan that fails to meet the minimum distribution re-
quirements would be disqualified, although the regulations provide that the disqualification 
sanction will not be imposed for isolated failures. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(A)(9)-1, A-5, 
52 Fed. Reg. 28,070, 28,099 (1987). In contrast, with respect to traditional IRAs and Roth 
IRAs, the responsibility for withdrawing the minimum distribution amounts rests with the plan 
participants themselves. An IRA that fails to make minimum distributions would cease to be 
tax-exempt, see I.R.C. § 408(a)(6), but since each IRA is a separate plan, it is only the plan 
participant who is affected. 
 135. Although the required minimum distribution must currently be calculated separately 
for each IRA, see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.408-8, A-1, 52 Fed. Reg. at 28,102, the Treasury De-
partment permits these amounts to be totaled and the resulting total amount taken from any 
one or more of the plan participant’s IRAs. See Notice 88-38, 1988-1 C.B. 524. 
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tion rules and can do so more efficiently. Second, plan participants 
are usually not well-versed on the complex minimum distribution re-
quirements and are therefore prone to commit computational errors. 
Third, the introduction of an excise tax on plan administrators, 
rather than plan participants, would encourage compliance by those 
in the best position to do so.136 Finally, by monitoring the central-
ized efforts of plan administrators rather than the decentralized ef-
forts of plan participants, the Service will be in a better position to 
police minimum distribution rule compliance. 
4. Accounts must be distributed within the year following the 
participant’s (and spouse’s) death 
Upon the death of plan participants (and their spouses), qualified 
plan assets (including those held in Roth IRAs) would have to be 
distributed by December 31 of the year following the date of death. 
Except in the case of Roth IRAs or nondeductible contributions, any 
amounts distributed would immediately be subject to income tax. 
The logic of this requirement is straightforward. The reason for 
the special, highly favorable tax treatment of qualified plans is to cre-
ate an incentive to provide for one’s retirement. When the partici-
pant and the participant’s spouse are dead, there is no further justifi-
cation for costly tax incentives.137 
 
 136. This proposed change raises a potential problem regarding plan participants who, 
during the course of a year, roll over their retirement accounts into new retirement accounts 
with a different plan administrator. In the case of a direct rollover from one plan to another, 
the plan administrator of the transferring plan, prior to the transfer, would have the responsi-
bility to distribute the minimum distribution amount to the plan participant. If the plan par-
ticipant receives a distribution directly, the plan would provide a form specifying how much 
could be rolled over and how much was a minimum distribution that could not be rolled over. 
The plan administrator of the recipient plan would accept a rollover only if accompanied by the 
form. The recipient plan would, of course, be required to make a minimum distribution with 
respect to the rolled over amounts in the following year, based on their value as of December 
31 of the year of the rollover. 
 137. Note that paying the tax presents little difficulty to the beneficiaries. Plan accounts 
are highly liquid, consisting overwhelmingly of stocks, bonds, bank accounts, and mutual fund 
shares. (Some qualified plans, particularly plans of large employers, will invest in less liquid as-
sets, such as real estate, but the plan administrators have a fiduciary duty to make sure that the 
plan has sufficient liquidity to meet the need for distributions to beneficiaries.) The taxes gen-
erated by the distribution will simply be paid out of the distribution itself. The heirs may com-
plain about the “outrageous” amounts the government takes, but this complaint is no different 
from those made by anyone else who receives a lot of income and has to pay tax on it. Also, it 
should be remembered that the funds in the account should really have been taxed long ago, 
but, in effect, the government has made an interest-free loan to the participant in the amount 
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5. Limited income averaging for post-death distributions would be 
available 
Under a progressive income tax regime, income bunching occurs 
when the receipt of income earned over several years is received in 
one taxable year. In some cases, income may be exposed to a higher 
marginal tax bracket than it otherwise would have been had it been 
received in smaller increments over longer periods of time. Although 
marginal tax rates are much lower today than in decades past, we are 
nowhere near a flat tax regime, and income bunching can cause in-
creased taxes, albeit in a much more modest fashion than in prior 
years. Since the beneficiaries of a deceased participant will be com-
pelled to withdraw the participant’s account over a short time period 
(i.e., by the year following the death of the plan participant or his or 
her spouse), the distribution may be subject to an abnormally high 
tax bracket due to this bunching. 
To minimize potential inequity and defuse a possible critique of 
this proposal, income averaging should be made available to the 
beneficiaries of a deceased participant’s account. Now repealed, ten-
year averaging, later reduced to five-year averaging, was generally 
available for any lump sum distribution at one time.138 It would 
therefore not be difficult to restore either five- or ten-year averaging 
for post-death distributions. Five-year averaging seems the most rea-
sonable option, but even ten-year averaging would be a small price 
to pay for establishing the principle that tax deferral must end after 
the participant’s (or spouse’s) death. 
6. Reporting requirements would be increased 
To enable the Service to enforce the minimum distribution rules 
effectively, plan administrators would be required to submit informa-
tion returns to the Service notifying the Service of the commence-
 
of the tax that should have been paid. At some point, it is appropriate to repay that loan. What 
better time than after the participant’s (or spouse’s) death? From a moral perspective, any claim 
by the beneficiaries for a continuation of the tax subsidy is fairly weak. They, unlike the partici-
pant, have done nothing to earn these funds; they simply had the luck to be born to parents 
who could accumulate wealth. Why should others pay higher taxes so that these lucky ones can 
have a larger windfall? It also bears repeating that the benefits of tax-favored retirement saving 
are already skewed to high-income earners. 
 138. See I.R.C. § 402(d)(4)(A). Congress repealed the five-year averaging rules for lump-
sum distributions made after Dec. 31, 1999. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1401, 110 Stat. 1755 (1996). 
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ment of minimum distributions and specifying the birthdates of the 
participant (and the participant’s spouse, if the spouse is the desig-
nated beneficiary). In addition, the executor (or estate administrator) 
of a plan participant’s estate would have an affirmative duty to notify 
the plan administrator of the plan participant’s death (and/or the 
death of the plan participant’s spouse, if named as the designated 
beneficiary). 
7. Roth IRAs would be subject to the same minimum distribution rules 
as traditional IRAs 
Currently, the minimum distribution rules do not apply to Roth 
IRAs until the death of the plan participant.139 The purpose of the 
tax subsidy for qualified plans and IRAs is to encourage saving for 
retirement so that participants and their spouses can maintain their 
standard of living, not to encourage the creation of wealth for their 
heirs. Roth IRAs should not enjoy special tax status. Starting at the 
plan participant’s RBD, distributions from Roth IRAs should com-
mence. The minimum distribution rules should apply in a universal 
fashion to all tax-favored retirement saving. 
B. Proposal Two: Eliminate the Existing Minimum Distribution Rules 
and Replace Them with a Date of Death Distribution Mandate 
Some politicians may find the first proposal distasteful because in 
many cases it will accelerate the receipt of qualified plan distributions 
during the lives of the plan participants (and their spouses) and does 
not afford any tax deferral following their deaths. Their perception 
may be that this proposal, despite its inherent equity, amounts to a 
hidden tax increase, and, for that reason alone, they would not sup-
port it. 
We, therefore, offer a second proposal in response to those who 
might harbor such political misgivings. Under this proposal, no dis-
tributions would have to be made during the life of plan participants 
(or their spouses). However, as in the first proposal, upon the death 
of the plan participant (and his or her spouse), all the assets held in 
the qualified plan would have to be distributed by December 31 of  
 
 
 
 139. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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the year following such death. Income averaging would be available 
as in the first proposal.140 
This simple system has numerous virtues. First, plan participants 
(and their spouses) can easily comprehend this rule. Second, there 
are virtually no compliance issues during the lives of participants (and 
their spouses), relieving plan administrators and the Service of much 
of their respective oversight responsibilities. Enforcement of the 
minimum distribution rules would occur only once, when the par-
ticipant and spouse have died. The structure of this minimum distri-
bution system, too, would continue to encourage savings over con-
sumption during the lives of the participant and spouse. 
But the virtues of this simple rule come at a steeper price than 
that associated with the first proposal. More specifically, funds that 
the minimum distribution rules currently force out during the lives 
of plan participants (and their spouses) would be permitted to accu-
mulate tax free until their deaths. Initially, this represents a tempo-
rary increase in the current tax expenditure for qualified plans.141 
Moreover, because the wealthy are most able to capitalize upon the 
use of qualified plans,142 the additional tax subsidy would most likely 
accrue disproportionately in their favor. 
Despite its added cost, the second proposal is still an improve-
ment over the present system. Exchanging the allowance of lifetime 
accumulation for the elimination of post-death deferrals amounts to 
a significant reduction in the tax expenditure in the long run. This is 
due to the fact that under the present rules when children or grand-
children are named designated beneficiaries the permitted deferral 
period after the death of the plan participant is typically much longer 
than the period between the participant’s RBD and the participant’s 
death. For example, in Table I, there are twenty years between the 
RBD and death of the last to die of Owner and Spouse, but an addi-
tional twenty-four years of deferral to Child. Had the designated 
 
 140. See David A. Pratt & Dianne Bennett, Simplifying Retirement Plan Distributions, 57 
N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX ¶ 5.06[1][b] (“Any benefits remaining at the death of the owner 
or surviving spouse must be distributed, in full, by the due date for filing the federal estate tax 
return, regardless of whether a return is actually required.”). 
 141. The tax deferral incentive of this proposal would probably lead plan participants to 
hold their retirement assets in qualified plan solution longer. Because assets held at the death 
of plan participants are includible in the plan participant’s estate, see I.R.C. § 2039(a), the reve-
nue cost of instituting this proposal may be less then anticipated due to the likely increase in 
estate tax revenue generated. 
 142. See supra Section IV.B. 
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beneficiary named by Spouse been Grandchild (or Great-
grandchild), age two when Owner died, the deferral could have pro-
duced an additional seventy-one years of deferral! 
C. Transition Rules 
As with any proposed change in the tax laws, the issue arises as to 
whether there should be some transition rules to cushion the effect 
of the change. In connection with either proposal, the case for a 
transition rule is extremely weak. The major change in both propos-
als that is detrimental to taxpayers is the loss of tax deferral after the 
death of the participant and the participant’s spouse. Thus, a huge 
part of the tax subsidy is retained. Moreover, the proposals can be 
viewed as a refinement, hardly unprecedented, of the long-
established concept that nonretirement benefits (e.g., benefits to 
heirs) are supposed to be “incidental” to pension plans. It is ex-
tremely relevant that when Congress first imposed the minimum dis-
tribution requirements on all plans, it saw no need to provide a tran-
sitional rule, other than deferring the effective date a few years for 
governmental and collectively bargained plans.143 Just as there may 
have been many at that time who had planned to accumulate their 
retirement benefits well after age seventy, today there may be many 
who had planned on their heirs accumulating benefits well after their 
death. Neither expectation is particularly worthy of protection. 
D. Benefits Associated with the Adoption of Either of These Proposals 
Consider the effects were Congress to adopt either of these pro-
posals.144 No longer would the minimum distribution rules be a 
source of plan participant confusion and malaise. Armed with a sen-
sible set of rules that they could comprehend, brokerage houses, tax 
planners, and the Service would benefit as well. Finally, under either 
proposal, although certainly more so under the first, unnecessary and 
inequitable tax subsidies would be reduced. 
 
 
 143. See Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 521(d)(2)-(5), 98 Stat. 494, 
868 (1984). 
 144. At least one commentator has suggested that the minimum distribution rules be 
reformed or repealed. See Mark J. Warshawsky, Minimum Distribution Requirements: Reform 
or Remove Them, 82 TAX NOTES 1133 (1998). He, however, offers few constructive sugges-
tions to make the minimum distribution rules more administrable or equitable. 
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The simple truth is that tax-free compounding already provides 
more than adequate incentive for taxpayers to participate in and con-
tribute to qualified plans. Were either of these proposals adopted, 
few, if any, plan participants would forfeit their participation in quali-
fied plans or reduce their contributions. Under current law, the 
benefits of tax-free compounding that serendipitously inure to des-
ignated beneficiaries (other than the plan participant’s surviving 
spouse) are thus entirely unwarranted and unnecessary to spur quali-
fied plan participation. 
Yet, congressional passage of either of these proposals would not 
necessarily be easy.145 The proposal to modify the existing minimum 
distribution rules would likely face stiff opposition from plan partici-
pants who have large retirement benefits as well as from their benefi-
ciaries who would lose a significant tax deferral advantage.146 Despite 
this potential opposition, the shortcomings of the minimum distribu-
tion rules are too weighty to be ignored; they must be scrapped for 
something better. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The current minimum distribution rules threaten to turn the 
pool of wealth held by qualified plans into a vast and burgeoning 
ocean. Following the model set by Chinese officials in constructing 
the Three Gorges Dam, Congress should properly harness the power 
of this ocean of wealth. Adoption of either proposal set forth in Sec-
tion V would establish effective floodgates for the retirement system, 
ensuring that the tax-subsidized wealth housed in the sanctuary of 
qualified plans is used primarily to meet the retirement needs of plan 
participants (and their spouses) and not to create windfalls for their 
 
 145. Indeed, a new bill in Congress would exacerbate the dysfunctional nature of the 
minimum distribution rules. The bill, entitled “Financial Freedom Act of 1999” proposes that 
the minimum distribution rules be further relaxed; it would essentially eliminate the “at least as 
rapidly rule” under I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(B)(i). 
 146. The proposal to replace the minimum distribution rule with a distribution at death 
mandate would be scored as a revenue loser, even though in the long run it raises revenue. 
(This is because the current revenue scoring system used in the budget process looks forward a 
maximum of ten years.) Given the present budget surplus, the revenue scoring process might 
actually work in favor of the second proposal since Congress could appear to be cutting taxes 
when in fact in the long run it was raising them. This is the precise opposite of the scoring of 
Roth IRAs, which in the short run increase revenue (since contributions are not deductible, as 
is the case with traditional IRAs) but in the long run their utilization by taxpayers results in 
tremendous revenue losses. 
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heirs. Immense amounts of revenue would be generated while leav-
ing intact more than sufficient incentives to save for retirement. 
From an administrative and equity perspective, the outcome of this 
harnessing process would be awe-inspiring, creating a structure as 
magnificent as the Three Gorges Dam. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
